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Abstract 
Inflation targeting is currently popular with central banks. Is this popularity justified? 
I investigate this question by comparing a speed limit policy and inflation targeting 
with a Lucas-type Phillips curve capturing output gap persistence. If the output gap is 
at least moderately persistent, a speed limit policy can: (1) partly eliminate the state-
contingent inflation bias, and (2) reduce inflation variability at no output gap 
variability cost. 
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1. Introduction 
When monetary policy is discretionary, inflation targeting is typically sub-optimal. 
Often, alternative policies will exist which impose lower costs on society. One such 
alternative is the speed limit policy which replaces the output gap with its first 
difference in the loss function of the central bank (Walsh, 2003a). Using a New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, Walsh showed a speed limit policy will outperform 
inflation targeting (unless inflation is predominantly backward- looking) because it 
imparts inertia like the optimal commitment policy when expectations are forward-
looking (Woodford, 2003). This ‘speed limit’ result has been further investigated by 
Yetman (2006) who found it was robust to relaxations in standard assumptions 
regarding credibility and expectations formation. 
  
The second factor in favour of a speed limit policy is measurement error. As Walsh 
(2003b) points out, revisions in the first difference of the US output gap are 
historically much lower than revisions in its level. 1 A speed limit policy therefore 
offers the prospect of reduced scope for real-time policy error. Interestingly, Walsh 
(2003a) notes that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) press releases suggest 
that the Fed already thinks about policy in speed limit terms, while both Peel et al. 
(2004) and Paez-Farrell (2007) find empirical support for a speed limit form of the 
Taylor rule in the US. Though there are identification problems with Taylor rule 
estimations generally (e.g. Gillman, Le and Minford, 20072), measurement error 
issues do appear to have been given greater prominence in the US than in the UK or 
mainland Europe.3 
 
In this paper, I follow Walsh (2003a) and Yetman (2006) by ignoring any 
measurement error benefits in order to focus on pure stabilisation issues. However, in 
contrast to these papers, I take a neoclassical Phillips curve as my starting point. The 
contribution of the paper is to show that benefits of speed limit policies are not 
confined to the New Keynesian Phillips curve specification.  Specifically, a speed 
                                                  
1 For the period 1970-2002, full-sample revisions in the output gap were sometimes in excess of 3% of 
potential output. By comparison, revisions in the first difference of the output gap did not exceed 1.5% 
of potential output for the same period.   
2 These authors show that in an endogenous growth model with cash and credit in advance, a central 
bank following a Friedman rule for the money supply appears, via the Fischer equation for nominal 
interest rates, to be following a speed limit form of the Taylor rule.  
3 See, for example, Orphanides (2001). 
policy and inflation targeting are compared with a neoclassical Lucas-type Phillips 
curve capturing output gap persistence. By appropriate choice of the relative weight 
on real economy stabilisation, a speed limit policy: (1) partly eliminates the state-
contingent inflation bias of discretionary policy, and (2) reduces inflation variability 
for any given level of output gap variability. Both these results require the output gap 
to be ‘at least moderately persistent’.4  
 
2. The model 
The model follows Svensson (1997, 1999) and Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999). 
It comprises three equations:      
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(1a) is the intertemporal loss function delegated to the central bank by society. The 
central bank’s goal is thus to minimize the discounted sum of its expected future 
(period) losses. The period loss function tL  varies depending on the delegated policy: 
 
 
=tL  
 
 
 
where tp  is inflation and tx  is the output gap, defined as the log of the ratio of output 
to its flex-price steady state value. The parameters ITl , 0>SLl  are the relative 
weights on real economy stabilisation dele gated to the central bank under each policy. 
        
(1b) is the economy’s Lucas-type Phillips curve, which shows that the output gap 
persists and that inflation will influence the output gap if and only if actual and 
expected inflation differ (a so-called ‘inflation surprise’ term) . a  is a positive 
                                                  
4 The term ‘at least moderately persistent’ is taken from Svensson (1999) who uses it to refer to a first-
order autocorrelation in the output gap greater than or equal to
2
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parameter representing the slope of Phillips curve and te  is an i.i.d. supply shock with 
mean zero and variance .2s   
 
(1c) states that inflation expectations etp  are formed rationally conditional upon 
period t-1’s information set.  Using this rational expectations assumption in (1b) gives 
us a Phillips curve which is neoclassical in the sense that it satisfies the natural rate 
hypothesis. 
 
3. Solving the model 
Set-up the Lagrangian: 
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where tL takes the form of (2a) or (2b) - which depends on the policy considered - 
and tm is a Lagrange multiplier. The solution method follows Dittmar, Gavin and 
Kydland (1999). It consists of four steps: 
 
1. Minimise with respect to tp and tx , and eliminate the resulting Lagrange multiplier 
to get a single first-order condition; 
 
2. Posit a linear decision rule for inflation of the form:5   
ttt AxA ep 211 += -         (4) 
and use this to find tx  as a function of 1-tx  and te ; 
 
3. Express the first-order condition in terms of only constants, ttx e,1-  and the 
undetermined coefficients 1A and 2A ; 
 
4. Collect terms to identify 1A and 2A , and hence the solutions for tp and tx . 
 
 
                                                  
5 I have used the fact that there will be no average inflation bias, under either policy, to set the constant 
equal to the inflation target of zero. 
3. 1 Inflation targeting 
Following this method gives the solutions derived by Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland 
(1999): 
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3.2 Speed limit policy 
The first-order conditions with respect to tx  and tp are: 
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Combining these to eliminate the multiplier produces the first-order condition:  
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And via (4) and (1b):  
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Using (8a)-(8c), (7) can be written in terms of 1-tx  and te , allowing us to identify 
coefficients.  
 
The solutions that emerge, after some simple but tedious algebra, are: 
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4. The state contingent inflation bias 
Consider the term ITt
IT xA 11 -  in (5a). Svensson (1997) calls this a ‘state-contingent 
inflation bias’ of discretionary policy. This bias arises because with persistence a non-
zero output gap in the previous period is expected to translate into a non-zero output 
gap in the current period, thus conflicting with the inflation targeting central bank’s 
output gap target of zero. In response, the central bank attempts to close such 
deviations by either ‘climbing’ or ‘sliding down’ the Phillips curve.  
 
With rational expectations all such attempts are futile; they produce no effect on the 
output gap (because they are incorporated into expected inflation) but do increase 
inflation variability. It is this inefficiency in the discretionary inflation targeting 
solution which a speed limit policy can partly eliminate if output gap is at least 
moderately persistent (i.e.
2
1
³r ). 
In order to see this, consider the term SLt
SLxA 11 -  in (9a) which I shall call the state-
contingent inflation bias of a speed limit policy. First, notice that the inflation bias 
term changes in sign under a speed limit policy because the central bank now expects 
persistence to keep the output gap too low relative to target (the previous period’s 
output gap) when the previous period’s output gap is positive, and vice versa when it 
is negative. Second, for a delegated weight 
)21(1 rb
l
l
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central bank’s loss function, the state-contingent inflation bias is lower in absolute 
terms under a speed limit policy so long as the output gap is at least moderately 
persistent.6 This observation leads to Proposition 1. 
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This inequality is satisfied by 
2
1
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This result is easily explained: persistence in the output gap ‘aids’ the speed limit 
central bank in achieving its output gap target- the previous period’s output gap - thus 
giving it a lower incentive to climb, or slide down, the Phillips curve in the face of 
supply shocks.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
6 This finding indicates that the speed limit central bank has a lower incentive to spring inflationary 
(deflationary) surprises in an attempt to climb (slide down) the Phillips curve. 
5. Inflation and output gap variability 
Now consider the variances in inflation and the output gap resulting under each policy, 
as shown by equations (A1) to (A4) of Appendix A. It will be shown that Proposition 
1 implies that, even if ITl is optimally chosen, delegating a weight 
)21(1 rb
l
l
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SL to the speed limit central bank delivers reduced inflation 
variability for any given level of output gap variability.  
 
Proposition 2 
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gap variance, but a lower inflation variance.  
 
Proof. By Proposition 1 the output gaps (and thus their variances) are equal, and 
substituting this SLl in (9a) and comparing to (5a) shows that the inflation responses to 
a supply shock are also identical. 
 
That is: 
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Using (11a) and (11b) in the inflation variance solutions (A2) and (A4) of Appendix 
A, there is a lower inflation variance under a speed limit policy, i.e. 
)var( SLtp < )var(
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By Proposition 1, this inequality is satisfied by
2
1
³r .   Q.E.D. 
 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The lower incentive to inflate (for a 
given l ) gives the speed limit central bank ‘leeway’ to increase its weight on real 
economy stabilisation above the inflation targeting central bank, and thus match the 
output gap variance it achieves, while still leaving the inflation bias, which 
contributes to inflation variability, lower. 
We can see this result illustrated in Figure 1, which plots a sample inflation-output 
gap variance trade-off. The reduction in inflation variance for a given output gap 
variance, grows as the output gap variance is reduced because, in order to achieve this 
reduction, the central bank must be delegated an increasingly high relative weight on 
real economy stabilisation. A higher relative weight on real economy stabilisation 
increases the incentive for inflation bias, and this exactly what the speed limit policy 
partly eliminates. A speed policy is thus of particular benefit to a society which places 
a high weight on output gap stability.   
 
Figure 1 
The inflation-output gap variance trade-off ( 99.0=b , 22 =s , 8.0=r and 5.0=a )7 
 
                                                  
7 Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999) estimate the degree of persistence in the output gap in the G-10 
countries to be around 0.8 (though it is notably higher in the US), and use 5.0=a in their simulations. 
A copy of the MATLAB program used to construct Figure 1 is available from the author on request. 
6. Conclusion  
Previously, the monetary policy literature had shown speed limit policies to have 
desirable stabilisation properties only in forward- looking New Keynesian models. 
However, in this paper we have seen that a neoclassical model reaches a similar 
conclusion with the proviso that there is at least moderate persistence in the output 
gap. The stabilisation benefits of speed limit policies are therefore greater than has 
been commonly acknowledged. 
 
Appendix A– Variance solutions  
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Speed limit policy 
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